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On May 12th 2017, business-as-usual in the National Health 
Services (NHS) in the UK was suddenly disrupted as IT 
systems in several hospitals and medical centers across the 
UK were attacked by so called “ransomware” that blocked 
access to any files until a ransom was paid.1 Affected 
hospitals canceled all operations, ambulances were diverted 
to A&E in other, not affected, hospitals. In the following 
days the impact of this cyber attack on the NHS was evident 
among many institutions and businesses in the UK. For 
example, in the afternoon of May 12th, the IT department of 
a University released a message to all staff warning them 
about this ransomware attack and announcing measures to 
protect the University. On May 15th, staff in a local 
supermarket was constantly apologizing to customers about 
till systems being very slow, and not being able to process 
“click and collect” orders: “I cannot scan the parcel, the 
system is just not loading, because of this IS incident” a staff 
member commented. On May 16th, the Headmaster of a local 
school emailed all parents that, as a preventive measure, all 
external emails having attachments would be automatically 
removed and that updated security software would be 
implemented shortly.
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Abstract
In an era when technologies have become a backbone of most organizations, IT support functions are under immense 
pressure not only to ensure provision and reliability of IS and technologies but also to resolve IS incidents of different 
severity when they disrupt organizations’ “business-as-usual.” This article addresses this challenge by investigating how 
organizational IT functions coordinate their work under different degrees of uncertainty in order to provide reliable IT 
services. We conceptualize coordination in IT support functions as a process that unfolds over time through interactions 
between four underlying coordination practices employed to provide reliable IT services: prioritizing tasks, following 
procedures, using roles and responsibilities, and utilizing networks. Furthermore, we show how these coordination 
practices change when IT incidents cause a shift from normal (i.e. “business-as-usual”) to emergency conditions. Our 
empirical research in two IT functions supporting two types of organizations (traditional and fast-response) demonstrate 
that IT functions in these two types of organizations respond to emergencies differently. Specifically, in emergencies, 
an IT function supporting a fast-response organization shifts to emergency coordination practices momentarily, as it 
abandons “normal” coordination practices to rely on an extensive set of formal practices specifically designed for such 
situations. In contrast, an IT function supporting a traditional organization is unprepared for emergencies—coordinating 
under emergency conditions involves improvisation, because coordination practices designed to support business-as-
usual are not suitable for dealing with emergency situations.
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This example brings to fore the role of the Information 
Technology (IT) support function in enabling organizations 
to restore their business after this has been disrupted by a 
severe IT-related incident. Today, organizations’ depend-
ence on IT (and therefore on the IT support function) is 
immense: medical doctors cannot operate without access to 
patient information, which may be a case of life or death for 
some patients; retail business is disrupted by slow systems, 
schools and universities cannot function in their usual way 
until their IT support function is able to restore access to 
systems and ensure that security measures are in place. 
Hence, these incidents create increased levels of uncer-
tainty about the availability and reliability of IT services, 
suddenly making the typically “invisible” IT support func-
tion the focal point of attention, as organizations’ ability to 
go back to normal depends on it. In this article, we focus on 
this increasingly important role of the IT function in organi-
zations and analyze how the IT function coordinates inter-
dependent tasks and actors in order to realize a collective 
performance in terms of restoring a reliable provision of IT 
services that meet business requirements after an IT-related 
incident.
While the reliability of IT (Butler and Gray, 2006) and 
the role of the IT support function in organizations 
(Guillemette and Paré, 2012; Peppard, 2003, 2018; 
Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000; Tarafdar and Tanriverdi, 
2018) have been studied by Information Systems (IS) 
scholars, to the best of our knowledge researchers have not 
considered the dynamic nature of work in an IT support 
function to reflect how work is coordinated in this function 
in response to incidents that create uncertainty about this 
reliability. Given the impact of IT-related incidents on 
organizations, it seems imperative to understand how IT 
support functions respond to such incidents by effectively 
coordinating work in order to be able to reliably provide IT 
services under different degrees of uncertainty. As inci-
dents concern a change of state in an IS (typically from a 
desired to an undesired state) (Baskerville et al., 2014), it is 
to be expected that in order to be able to respond to this, the 
IT function will also have to change the way it coordinates 
its work in order to restore reliable IT services. Therefore, 
our interest is in how coordination of work in the IT func-
tion changes in response to IT-related incidents.
Disruptions of IT services might be triggered by multi-
ple factors. For instance, there can be external triggers such 
as the Egyptian revolution of 2011 that led to a shutdown of 
the Internet in Egypt and meant that some multinationals 
experienced service disruptions, having to evacuate expa-
triates to their home countries. Internal factors such as an 
acquisition or appointment of a new top executive also 
often trigger IT-related organizational change (e.g. the need 
to integrate IT systems of two merging organizations and 
transform the way back-offices provide IT-enabled ser-
vices, or offshoring an IT-enabled business processes). 
Some of these triggers may not be immediate, allowing the 
IT support function to prepare for the change (e.g. to plan 
an enterprise system implementation as a phased approach; 
Umble et al., 2003), while others, like in the case of the 
ransomware attack, would be considered as an emergency 
and would require immediate action from the IT support 
function in response to a sudden increase in uncertainty 
about the provision of IT services. The earlier example of 
the impact of a ransomware attack is shedding light onto 
how IT support functions of some organizations are 
responding to particular emergency situations. In this 
example, their responses varied from “24/7 focusing on 
resolving the issue” (in NHS), to issuing a warning (in the 
university) and finding a creative temporary solution such 
as removing all attachments (at the school).
Looking beyond this specific example toward theory-
building, these observations warrant further research into, 
and theorizing about, how organizational IT functions coor-
dinate their work under different degrees of uncertainty in 
order to provide reliable IT services. Our study focuses on 
how the coordination practices that IT functions employ to 
provide reliable IT services change when IT incidents cause 
a change from normal (i.e. “business-as-usual”) to emer-
gency conditions. We conceptualize IT functions’ responses 
to an emergency as a “shift” of coordination practices and 
analyze how such a shift actually happens, leading to a 
change in coordination practices employed under different 
levels of uncertainty. Hence, our research question is “How 
does coordination in IT support functions change in 
response to emergency situations?”
This research makes a unique contribution to the IS lit-
erature by theorizing coordination in the IT support func-
tion as a dynamic process that changes as this function is 
confronted with emergency conditions. Furthermore, we 
specifically study this change in two types of organizations: 
traditional and fast-response. Our study demonstrates that 
while there is a single baseline depicting coordination in 
both IT support functions under normal operating condi-
tions, IT functions in two different types of organizations 
respond to emergencies differently, which is captured in the 
process view. Our results indicate that, in emergencies, an 
IT function supporting a fast-response organization shifts 
to emergency coordination practices momentarily, as it 
abandons “normal” coordination practices to rely on an 
extensive set of formal practices specifically designed for 
such situations. In contrast, for an IT function supporting a 
traditional organization, this shift is taking longer and coor-
dinating under emergency conditions involves improvisa-
tion, because coordination practices designed to support 
business-as-usual are not suitable for dealing with emer-
gency situations.
Theoretical background
The increasing globalization and digitization the world is 
witnessing today is manifested in the extensive reliance on 
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information technologies which we experience on the indi-
vidual, organizational, and societal levels. The complexity 
and rate of development of digital technologies make it 
increasingly difficult to predict the behavior of these tech-
nologies and make organizations increasingly vulnerable to 
technological incidents that fundamentally affect them. As 
Butler and Gray (2006) put it, “individuals, organizations, 
and societies increasingly depend on information systems 
to reliably provide core services and capabilities” (p. 211), 
which highlights reliability as a central concern of the IT 
support function across a wide range of organizations 
(Guillemette and Paré, 2012).
The IT support function is responsible for the reliable 
provision of a broad and dynamically changing range of 
services concerning the processing, provisioning, and stew-
ardship of information (Peppard, 2003), including hard-
ware and software selection and installation, building and 
managing an IT infrastructure, coordination of IT-based 
projects, systems development and maintenance, user sup-
port, and leading digital innovation initiatives (Guillemette 
and Paré, 2012; Jia and Reich, 2013; Kettinger and Lee, 
1994; Tarafdar and Tanriverdi, 2018). In order to be able to 
deliver those services, the interdependent tasks of various 
people and sub-units that are part of the IT function need to 
be coordinated—from development to maintenance, from 
operations to project management, etc. For any IT function, 
coordinating work to ensure the reliable provision of IT 
systems and services is a daunting endeavor—especially 
when having to respond to increasingly frequent and severe 
disruptions, as we elaborate in the next section.
IT incidents, business-as-usual, and 
emergencies
IT functions are increasingly confronted with IT incidents 
in the form of “discrepant IT events” (de Guinea and 
Webster, 2013). IT incidents are defined as “a change of 
state in a bounded information system from the desired 
state to an undesired state” or “an event that evades any 
preventative controls [. . .] and inflicts negative changes on 
information systems” (Baskerville et al., 2014: 139). 
Incidents, for instance, can be operational failures in hard-
ware, software, or networks, or security and privacy inci-
dents. Such incidents can disrupt business-as-usual, putting 
pressure on the IT support function.
The extent to which business-as-usual is interrupted by 
such incidents is partly determined by the gravity of the 
incident, but also by the nature of the organization that a 
particular IT function is supporting. Going back to the 
opening example of the ransomware attack, the IT function 
in the NHS (which is supporting hospitals across the United 
Kingdom) was put under enormous pressure to resolve the 
situation, because it presented a matter of life or death for 
many patients. On the other hand, for the IT function of the 
food retail chain, this incident was potentially related to the 
loss of revenue (as a result of tills being slow), but it did not 
endanger human lives. Therefore, IT functions in high 
uncertainty environments (e.g. hospitals, fire brigades, 
police) are typically expected to act as a fast-response 
organization themselves, as they are required to respond to 
a disruption immediately, flexibly and without room for 
error, resolving the incident so that the organization could 
return back to normal operating conditions. Furthermore, in 
fast-response organizations, the IT support function is 
expected to support urgent IT-related requests related to a 
specific mission or operation, which are typically associ-
ated with life-threatening urgency and unexpected events, 
requiring organizations to operate under time constraints 
and confused inputs (Schakel et al., 2016) and have low 
tolerance to mistakes.
When put under pressure, the conditions associated with 
emergency (high uncertainty, fast decision making, mis-
takes can be catastrophic) are also valid for the IT support 
function in traditional (i.e. non fast-response) organizations 
when business-as-usual is disrupted. A bank, for instance, 
can be confronted with an emergency if the electronic 
banking system is being hacked, threatening the integrity of 
customer and transaction data and ultimately the organiza-
tion’s survival. Conversely, a fast-response organization is 
not always in an emergency mode: even fire fighters, SWAT 
teams, A&E physicians, and military personnel have rou-
tine processes and procedures guiding the non-emergency 
part of their day-to-day work. Hence, in both traditional 
and fast-response organizations, we will find normal oper-
ating conditions and emergency operating conditions.
Normal operating conditions entail internal and external 
environmental conditions that an organization is prepared 
and designed for, based on past experience and predictable 
future changes. Such conditions would constitute business-
as-usual for the organization, characterized by generally low 
levels of uncertainty. Emergency operating conditions are 
experienced when the organization is facing a situation that 
(1) contains pervasive uncertainty (i.e. incidents that do not 
fit routine procedures); (2) creates pressure for quick execu-
tion (e.g. the need to avoid delays in the case of a film pro-
duction crew (Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011), or the need to 
directly repair a data leak at a security agency); and (3) can 
have negative consequences such as additional costs (e.g. 
loss of customers for a web shop that was hacked) or creates 
a danger of severe physical harm (e.g. for members of a 
SWAT team and people close to the place where the mission 
is taking place). Whenever an IT incident creates such con-
ditions, this is likely to put different demands on coordina-
tion in the IT support function. Under normal operating 
conditions, coordination efforts in the IT support function 
would focus on the provision of relevant IT services in a 
reliable way. However, when emergency conditions arise, 
service provision is threatened, and the IT function’s coordi-
nation efforts would focus on resolving the emergency in 
order to restore the reliable provision of IT services.
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To achieve a deeper understanding of the challenges of 
coordination in the IT function, we turn to the literature on 
coordination in organizations.
Coordination in the IT function
Faraj and Xiao (2006: 1157) define coordination as: “a tempo-
rally unfolding and contextualized process of input regulation 
and interaction articulation to realize a collective perfor-
mance.” As Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) argue, “[t]his defi-
nition best fits the spirit of [the] recent wave of coordination 
research, reflecting scholars’ shared interest in the emergent 
nature of the process of coordination” (p. 469). In this study, 
we analyze how the interdependent work of various individu-
als in the IT function is coordinated in practice, in order to 
achieve a “collective performance” in terms of the reliable 
provision of IT services that meet business requirements.
In studying the coordination of work in the IT function, it 
is important to realize that this is knowledge-intensive work: 
it requires employees not only to be experts in currently 
used technologies but also to understand current and future 
technological trends, as well as the requirements that busi-
ness places on the IT function (Basselier and Benbasat, 
2004). IT personnel are experts who are engaged in knowl-
edge-intensive work to meet the requirements of multiple 
stakeholders to ensure (continuous) reliability of IS. In this 
light, the seminal work by Faraj and Xiao (2006) is espe-
cially relevant, as it reframes the concept of coordination to 
accommodate the nature of knowledge-intensive work. 
They argue that “for environments where knowledge work 
is interdisciplinary and highly contextualized, the relevant 
lens is one of practice. Practices emerge from an ongoing 
stream of activities and are enacted through contextualized 
actions of individuals” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1157). 
Adopting the practice lens to study coordination has allowed 
scholars to enhance our understanding of how complex and 
highly interdependent work can effectively be coordinated 
in different knowledge-intensive organizational settings. 
Hence, our primary interest is in the coordination practices 
found in the IT function, and how these practices play a role 
in the coordination of the interdependent tasks of different 
actors with the aim to achieve reliable IT services.
In analyzing these practices, it is important to move 
beyond traditional coordination theory’s focus on studying 
how coordination is accomplished, that is, the mode of 
coordination. In order to understand the actual practices 
of coordination, we also need to focus on other dimensions 
of coordination such as what (the content of the interde-
pendent work being coordinated), when (the circumstances 
under which the work takes place), and who (the individu-
als whose actions need to be coordinated in order to realize 
a collective outcome) (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). First, differ-
ences in terminology, meaning, perspectives, and interests 
impede coordination, creating a need to clarify and agree 
on what the subject of coordination is, and what knowledge 
is being coordinated. Furthermore, different knowledge 
boundaries create obstacles for communication between 
organizational members (Carlile, 2004) which in turn hin-
der the coordination of work. However, different approaches 
and specific techniques are required to transfer, translate, or 
transform knowledge across the different types of knowl-
edge boundaries (Carlile, 2004). Therefore, in terms of 
when, it is important to distinguish between circumstances 
associated with a specific boundary in order to decide on 
the appropriate approach to coordinate work across knowl-
edge boundaries. Last but not least, identifying who (which 
specific individuals) are involved in the collective perfor-
mance, whose knowledge and tasks need to be coordinated, 
is revealed as an important dimension of coordination, in 
particular in situations when tacit and personalized exper-
tise is required (Kotlarsky et al., 2014).
As the focus of our study is on how coordination in IT 
functions changes in response to emergency situations, rele-
vant insights can be obtained from recent studies on coordi-
nation that pay specific attention to organizations that are 
often faced with emergencies (e.g. Faraj and Xiao, 2006; 
Kellogg et al., 2006; Kotlarsky et al., 2014; Schakel et al., 
2016; Venters et al., 2014). Examples of such organizations 
are professionals protecting national security (Jarvenpaa and 
Majchrzak, 2008), emergency-response teams (Faraj and 
Xiao, 2006), police work (Schakel et al., 2016), and emer-
gent groups responding to disasters (Majchrzak et al., 2007). 
In particular, Faraj and Xiao (2006) argue that traditional 
coordination theory has limited applicability for such fast-
response organizations (defined as organizations that gener-
ally operate under conditions of high uncertainty “where 
decisions must be made rapidly and where errors can be 
fatal”; Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1155) because of the high-
velocity environment in which they operate. They argue that
the dilemma of coordination in such settings is that, on the one 
hand, there is a need for tight structuring, formal coordination, 
and hierarchical decision making to ensure a clear division of 
responsibilities, prompt decision processes, and timely action; 
but, on the other hand, because of the need for rapid action and 
the uncertain environment, there is a competing need to rely on 
flexible structures, on-the-spot decision making, and informal 
coordination modes. (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1557)
This dilemma is reflected in various studies focusing on 
coordination practices in fast-response settings. For instance, 
Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008) found that national secu-
rity professionals tend to prefer their own personal networks 
over formal organizational structures for the rapid ad hoc 
knowledge collaboration required in case of an emergency. 
Similarly, Majchrzak et al. (2007) discussed how emergency 
situations lead to a shift from formal mechanisms and shared 
mental models, toward action-based coordination through 
dialogic practices.2 Bouty et al. (2012) present a cross-case 
analysis of coordination in extreme situations which shows 
a significant heterogeneity of coordination practices in such 
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situations across the four cases they discuss, finding both 
highly formalized and vertical, and very informal and hori-
zontal practices based on the specific context of each case.
Although previous studies on coordination in fast-
response and traditional settings have been influential in 
setting the scene for further theory development on coordi-
nation, they do not shed much light on how coordination 
practices change in response to disruptions of business-as-
usual—what the shift in coordination practices is that 
accompanies the change from business-as-usual to emer-
gency situations. As illustrated with our examples concern-
ing the IT support function in organizations, IT-related 
incidents may disrupt these organizations’ business-as-
usual until they have been addressed in some way. But 
exactly how coordination of IT support work is adapted in 
response to such incidents is a currently under-researched 
subject. This study aims to address this gap, focusing on 
how the IT function’s coordination practices are influenced 
by the increasing amount and severity of incidents they are 
faced with. Hence, with this theoretical background in 
mind (see Table 1 for a summary of key constructs), our 
empirical research was driven by the question “How does 
coordination in IT support functions change in response to 
emergency situations?”. Specifically, we ask how the coor-
dination practices of IT support functions in both traditional 
and fast-response organizations change when operating 
conditions shift from normal (i.e. business-as-usual) to 
emergency conditions as a result of IT-related incidents.
In the next section, we explain how we designed our 
empirical research to address our research question, and the 
methods we used to collect and analyze the data.
Research design and methods
Research design
Our research was designed as an open-ended inductive study 
of coordination in a large Governmental IT Service 
Organization, part of a European country’s Ministry of 
Defense (MoD). This IT Service Organization comprised 
two IT divisions operating as independent units—one is pro-
viding IT services to all civilian facilities of the MoD and the 
other one is providing IT services to the military (i.e. opera-
tional) side of the MoD. As one author was involved in previ-
ous research in this organization, we were sufficiently 
familiar with differences between the two IT functions which 
we categorized (after careful examination of the literature 
that distinguishes different organizational forms) as fitting 
characteristics of a traditional and a fast-response organiza-
tion (respectively). Contacts that one of the authors had in 
this IT Service Organization were used to start a preliminary 
investigation of operating conditions that both IT functions 
face and to negotiate access to, and commitment of, the IT 
Service Organization to this research project. Initial inter-
views focused on understanding a high-level perspective on 
coordination in both IT functions. One theme that emerged 
from these initial interviews was that coordination was 
accomplished differently, under different circumstances. 
Intrigued to understand the dynamic nature of coordination 
in the IT support function we adopted an embedded multiple 
case design focusing on two units (Langley et al., 2013). To 
explore changes in the coordination of work, we asked inter-
viewees about their coordination practices when working 
under normal conditions, about events that triggered emer-
gency conditions, and how coordination of work was accom-
plished when dealing with an unfolding emergency situation. 
Our research design and data collection process is illustrated 
in Appendix A (Figure 4).
Empirical setting
At the time of data collection, the IT Service Organization 
(hereafter referred as ITSO) had approximately 1900 
employees who maintained over 70,000 workstations across 
the globe, the underlying IT infrastructure and hundreds of 
software applications. The organization also delivered 




“A temporally unfolding and contextualized process of input regulation and interaction articulation to 
realize a collective performance” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1157).
Traditional IT 
support function
A relatively stable IT support function with a more or less permanent hierarchy, a generally centralized 
structure, routinized, rule-based and standardized processes, clearly specified and persistent boundaries, 
and predominantly vertical and dependent relationships (cf. Kellogg et al., 2006).
Fast-response IT 
support function
An IT support function that generally operates under conditions of high uncertainty “where decisions must 
be made rapidly and where errors can be fatal” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1155).
Normal operating 
conditions
“Business-as-usual”: operating conditions that an IT support function is prepared and designed for, based on 
past experience and predictable future changes.
Under these operating conditions, we consider an IT function to be in a normal state.
Emergency 
operating conditions
Operating conditions experienced when an IT support function is facing a situation that (1) contains 
pervasive uncertainty, (2) creates pressure for quick execution, and (3) can have negative consequences 
such as additional costs or creates a danger of severe physical harm.
Under these operating conditions, we consider an IT function to be in an emergency state.
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additional (IT-related) services such as conducting analyses, 
giving advice, delivering hardware and software solutions, 
and developing specific applications. ITSO is the internal IT 
service provider of the MoD, but also delivers services to 
other Ministries.
ITSO has two divisions, one responsible for all IT products 
and services in the civil (non-military) domain—Civit, and 
one responsible for all IT products and services in the military 
operations’ domain—Milit. As one interviewee explained,
So if you look at Civit, we mainly manage things in what we 
call the static domain, anything that’s stuck to the ground in 
our country. As soon as it is mobile, as soon as you go on a 
mission or an exercise and a network is rolled out there, then 
it’s Milit taking care of it. So that’s a different network then—
an Adaptive Military Network as we call it—hat can be either 
“red” or “black” based on the level of confidentiality. But the 
basic technology is similar anywhere, and those networks 
communicate with the help of military satellite communication. 
(Senior Advisor, Civit)
Specifically, as a Process Manager at Civit described 
what Civit is responsible for on a daily basis:
We deliver the workplaces all year long and the network and 
software that runs on it, and all the small standard modifications 
we will just take care of. Systems management, updates, we 
make sure it all keeps running, if there are failures we need to 
ensure that they are resolved, if there are incidents they need to 
be fixed.
In addition to this ongoing IT support, Civit is responsible 
for strategic IT planning and implementation of IT-related 
changes (e.g. replacing all printers with multiplexers that 
requite to enter one’s own code to pick up print).
Milit is responsible for putting in place IT networks and 
setting up infrastructure to support military missions and 
armed forces in war zones, including crypto distribution 
and cyber security management. As the Head of Internal 
Affairs at Milit described the scope of work that the IT sup-
port function in Milit is responsible for:
Milit has been established for the communication and 
information systems within the deployment areas and for 
military exercises. And indeed, some of it is confidential, 
but also regular message traffic. So here in the office 
environment [of ITSO] we have a peace network. Just our 
PC. And in the outlets, they also have the same PC only 
under operational conditions. So that’s actually a very 
different network, and that’s the network provided by Milit. 
In addition, we [Milit] also use the means of communication, 
connections, radio connections, satellite connections, so if a 
ship leaves the port then we also have it, and as a plane 
flies, the same thing. In addition, we also do the Coast 
Guard, all ships that go to sea and need to send a signal, and 
they usually do with HF and that’s all the antenna. And 
therefore we have locations all along the coast line, arming 
all parts of the coast.
The majority of Milit employees are soldiers in active or 
previous duty; when required, they travel to provide sup-
port in war zones. For example, the Project Office Manager 
at Milit explained that
for the people here [at Milit] it is actually normal that if there 
are problems in the field, during an operation in a deployment 
area, we will just go there for two or three weeks. Or we’ll go 
there for two months and we’ll be back. For the people here, 
those work visits are no longer called a deployment.
One Civit employee reflected on the role of IT support 
function and nature of work in Civit and Milit:
To the extent that the PCs should always work because people 
have to be able to do their work. And I think if you’re working 
for Defence now or you’re working for a retail chain, or if 
you’re working for I don’t know who, that shouldn’t matter. 
Not in the work we [IT support function] do. But the moment 
you really have very specific things like weapon ammunition 
systems, air traffic control, yes, you have a different situation. 
(Unit Manager, Civit)
Due to the nature of the military work context of Milit, 
we can classify this organization as a fast-response IT sup-
port function. Milit oftentimes deals with time-critical and 
complex situations where there is no room for mistakes as, 
for example, a lack of connection in the operational field 
may actually cost lives. Civit, on the other hand, is a tradi-
tional IT support function. Employees at Civit also deal 
with emergency situations caused by IS incidents that pre-
sent different levels of disruption, some of which are seri-
ous although (usually) not life-threatening. Both IT 
functions are physically located throughout the country in 
diverse military bases and across the globe in former colo-
nies of the European country and in deployment areas. 
Table 2 describes the differences between the two IT func-
tions along different characteristics.
Background to normal and emergency 
situations in Civit and Milit
Both IT functions dealt with emergency situations, yet with a 
different impact on the organization, their employees, and 
their clients when they talk about normal and emergency con-
ditions. The four examples included in Table 3 describe nor-
mal and emergency situations in Civit and Milit in order to 
illustrate the kind of work that is carried out in each IT func-
tion and to provide a general feel of emergency situations.
Data collection
We collected data over a 14-month time period between 
March 2011 and May 2012. We conducted 33 in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with employees from all hierar-
chical layers of both IT divisions and in different functional 
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Table 2. Background of civilian and military IT functions.
Civilian IT function (Civit) Military IT function (Milit)
Type of organization Traditional Fast-response
Number of employees ~1700 ~200
Nature of the work Responsible for all IT products and services 
in the civil (non-military) domain of the MoD
Responsible for all IT for military operations 
and missions; support Command and Control 
center of the “defense machine”
Clients All employees of the MoD and those of 
the Armed Forces departments working in 
peace zones; other ministries of the country
All deployed employees/units of the Armed 
Forces Departments
Percentage of military 
employees (in active duty or 
previous duty)
22% 83%
Nature of an “emergency” Event or situation that presents a (serious) 
disruption to running “business-as-usual” 
(e.g. unknown IS incident that is turning into 
a problem, “important IT unavailable for 
lots of people,” a serious IS incident that 
becomes a calamity)
Event or situation that requires immediate/
urgent action (e.g. IT for missions, military 
exercises in preparation for a mission, IS 
incidents in war zone or active networks, 
serious IT issues that can cause security 
breach)
Response to an “emergency” Resolve to go back to “normal” Accomplish urgent task in an effective and 
efficient manner
MoD: Ministry of Defense; IS: Information Systems.
Table 3. Normal and emergency situations in Civit and Milit.
Normal situation Emergency situation
Civit For example, replacing malfunctioning 
hardware:
So when someone’s computer is broken 
and they need a new computer, they report 
an incident at the service desk. Incident 
is made, then reported to the Incident 
Coordinator. They see this is hardware 
related, have to order new hardware 
in SAP. A new PC is ordered, then it is 
reported to planning, a hardware supplier is 
involved, and a delivery center—and then it 
is passed on. The logistics center is notified, 
and the relevant field service engineer, and 
they are notified that they need to deliver a 
PC to person X at the delivery location Y. 
(Senior IT maintenance employee, Civit)
For example, triggered by a serious accident:
“A few years back, there was this data center that needs to be cooled 
otherwise it might overheat and the whole thing crashes. On the roof 
of this data center there are five air generators of which we need three, 
or maybe four when it is really hot, to cool the thing and the fifth is a 
reserve generator, ‘in spare’. Then, one breaks down, but well, we still 
have four left so we can continue cooling anyway. The replacement 
process takes very long, because it needs to go through a European 
tender process, because the current service contract has expired. This 
tender process could take up to a year, so even though that thing is 
broken, well we still have four left so the priority is low. After a while, 
the fourth starts to rattle and it also breaks down. At that time, the 
data center does not receive enough cooling; the temperature starts to 
rise with all negative consequences following. A crisis evolves and it is 
this crisis situation that results in a night flight from [another European 
country] with a mechanic and a new unit in cargo to repair the air 
generators, where as in the normal process we have been discussing 
this replacement back and forward for over half a year.” (Product group 
manager, Civit)
Milit For example, supporting IT for military 
stations in war zones:
“Milit is used to responding to quickly 
changing situations. For example, during 
the Afghanistan Mission it was common 
that in Afghanistan a so-called ‘forward 
operating base’ (a FOB), a secured forward 
military position that is used to support 
tactical operations, needed repositioning, 
was dismissed or needed to be replaced. 
[. . .] New equipment needs to go there, 
thing must be arranged, configurations 
require adjustment, and so forth.” (Head of 
Operations Room, Milit)
For example, triggered by IT breakdown during a military mission:
“For instance, Afghanistan, those forward operating bases there. When 
I hear that the connections are gone there, I know what that means. 
That they can’t reach their people. And if they come into contact with 
opposing forces, that they can’t warn their commander. If a call like that 
comes in from Afghanistan, we know something must be done right 
away, get things going. So I know at that moment that immediate action 
must be taken to resolve that. If you get someone who doesn’t have 
that military past, or is not really part of the military organization, he 
won’t see that. He will think ‘so he can’t call, who cares that two units 
can’t contact each other for a while?’ You notice that if people don’t 
have that military past, it’s harder to get that understanding.” (Head of 
Knowledge Pool, Milit)
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roles (see details of the interviewees in Appendix C, Table 
9). Participants were motivated by ITSO to contribute to the 
study as the commanding officers from Civit and Milit 
wanted to address coordination and knowledge sharing 
practices in both IT divisions of ITSO. Almost all interviews 
were taped and transcribed verbatim. Interviews lasted from 
45 min to over 2 h in length and were conducted on a one-
on-one basis, except for two interviews that involved two 
interviewees at the same time. One author also spent time 
talking to employees informally, joining them for lunches 
during her visits to different military bases. She also partici-
pated in several management team meetings as an observer. 
In addition to the interviews and observations, we also 
gained insight into the formal meeting structure at both IT 
functions and documents describing projects (e.g. project 
initiation documents), work instructions (extended docu-
ments containing examples for several functional roles), and 
process guidelines. This secondary data provided important 
contextual information about both IT functions of ITSO.
As we intended to distinguish between coordination 
practices during normal and emergency states, we started 
the interviews by establishing a clear understanding of the 
difference between normal and emergency operating condi-
tions, as perceived by the respondent’s IT function. We then 
proceeded with open-ended questions to explore coordina-
tion activities and practices in which the interviewee was 
involved in his or her daily work under normal conditions. 
We asked about events that triggered changes to emergency 
conditions and how coordination was accomplished when 
dealing with the emergency situation. We used the four 
dimensions of coordination recognized as important for 
understanding coordination processes in knowledge-inten-
sive settings—what (content), how (mode), when (circum-
stances), and who (which specific individual is the person to 
contribute to joint coordinative efforts)—as a checklist to 
ask for clarifications and further details as interviewees 
were describing activities and practices (s)he was involved 
in to coordinate IT work. For example, if an interviewee was 
describing how (s)he was solving a specific IS incident, we 
would ask who were people (s)he was contacting. (Our data 
collection process is illustrated in Appendix A, Figure 4.)
Data analysis
Given the inductive nature of this research aiming to under-
stand the dynamics of coordination in IT support functions 
as they face emergency conditions, we followed guidance 
provided in Langley et al. (2013) for theory-building about 
change, as well as Langley (1999) for specific data analysis 
techniques. Specifically, we used a temporal bracketing 
strategy in our analysis to distinguish between periods 
when (1) coordination took place under normal conditions, 
(2) coordination took place under emergency conditions, 
and (3) the shift from normal conditions to emergency con-
ditions. These periods are described as Episodes 1, 2, and 3 
(respectively) in the “Analysis” section.
Interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software. Data analysis followed 
several steps. It relied on iterative reading of the data using 
the open-coding technique during which first order or sub-
ject codes were assigned (Gioia et al., 2013; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). Through sorting and refining themes emerg-
ing from the data, we applied the axial coding technique 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). In accordance with our 
embedded multiple case design, as we were moving from 
first-order concepts to second-order themes, we first distin-
guished between the two cases (Civit and Milit) and ana-
lyzed them separately (in steps 1–3) before moving to 
cross-case analysis (step 4). Our data analysis process is 
illustrated in Appendix B (Figure 5).
Step 1: analyzing events that triggered change in 
coordination
We coded and analyzed events that triggered changes in 
operating conditions. As each interviewee was asked about 
events that disrupted “business-as-usual,” and how they 
affected coordination, this allowed us to explore the nature 
of the shift from normal to emergency conditions based on 
replication of temporal observation (Langley et al., 2013) 
of such shifts triggered by the events.3 This analysis led us 
to distinguish between different natures of “emergency” in 
Civit and Milit (as illustrated in Table 2) and used for fur-
ther analysis of the shift (as described in step 3).
Step 2: analyzing coordination under different operat-
ing conditions (within-case analysis)
We coded and analyzed activities associated with coordina-
tion in Civit and Milit, making a distinction between activi-
ties that took place under normal and emergency conditions. 
Through iterative sorting of activities into themes and 
refining of emerging themes, we arrived at four second-
order themes that distinguish between four coordination 
practices: prioritizing tasks, following procedures, using 
roles and responsibilities, and utilizing networks. We con-
tinued our analysis and moved on to map inter-relationships 
between these practices: defining, prescribing, following, 
and deciding (as we discuss in the summaries at the end of 
Episodes 1 and 2). These inter-relationships are illustrated 
in Figures 1 and 2 using arrows that show how one practice 
influences or triggers (an)other practice(s), and what the 
nature of this influence/trigger is.
Step 3: analyzing how coordination practices were 
“adjusted” when faced with an emergency (within-
case analysis)
Based on the data coded during step 1, and an understand-
ing of how coordination was accomplished under normal 
and emergency conditions (based on step 2), we could 
focus our analysis on the shift from a normal to an 
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emergency state, aiming to conceptualize characteristics of 
the shift, including the time-dimension. We distinguished 
different events that triggered the shift. Categories of these 
events and exemplar quotes are included in Tables 6 and 7. 
Second-order themes that emerged distinguished the nature 
of the shift in the two IT functions as chaotic (in Civit), and 
formal and well-structured (in Milit). Our analysis of the 
shifts is presented in Episode 3 in the “Analysis” section.
Step 4: analyzing dynamics of the coordination process 
(cross-case analysis) toward theorizing
This step focused on iterative analysis and refining of 
our conceptualization of the shift and coordination under 
emergency conditions in Civit and Milit (as illustrated by 
loops 1 and 2 in Appendix B, Figure 5). Furthermore, we 
analyzed how inter-relationships between coordination 
practices (conceptualized in step 2) change when IT func-
tions shift to a state of emergency (i.e. how change in one 
practice triggers change in another practice). We compared 
the observed patterns of changes between Civit and Milit 
(a change from the inter-relationships depicted in Figure 1 
to the inter-relationships depicted in Figure 2—top square 
for Civit and bottom square for Milit). For example, the 
coordination practice “using roles and responsibilities” 
defines “prioritizing tasks” in all circumstances except 
when Civit is facing an emergency (top square of Figure 
2). In such situations the “prioritizing tasks” practice is 
triggered by an IS incident or calamity, influencing the 
“using roles and responsibilities” practice that invokes 
actions from escalation and crisis managers who are 
expected to facilitate resolution of the emergency situation.
This step concluded our data analysis and provided the 
basis for “climb[ing] the ladder of abstraction by inferring 
the general theoretical phenomenon of which the observed 
particular is a part” (Langley et al., 2013: 8) toward build-
ing a dynamic view of coordination process in traditional 
and fast-response IT support functions.
Analysis
Based on our analysis aiming to understand how the Civit 
and Milit IT functions coordinate work and how they 
change their approach to coordination when faced with 
emergencies we identified four high-level coordination 
practices enacted in these IT support functions: (1) prior-
itizing tasks is establishing what will be coordinated and 
when this coordination is to take place; (2) following proce-
dures is capturing formal ways to determine what should be 
coordinated and how this should be done; (3) using roles 
and responsibilities indicates who should be responsible for 
coordinating what (or who is likely to be an expert in what); 
and (4) utilizing networks depicts formal and informal links 
between individuals that explain who coordinates what and 
how it is achieved. Our findings indicate that these four 
practices may be enacted in various ways, that is, through a 
repertoire of different coordinative activities (as demon-
strated in Tables 4 and 5). While Civit and Milit coordinate 
work in a similar manner under normal conditions, these 
two IT functions respond differently to an emergency. In 
Figure 1. The dynamics of coordination under normal conditions.
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both cases, the enactment of coordination practices changed 
in response to emergencies, but the actual changes are quite 
different when we compare Civit and Milit. To illustrate 
this, we present our analysis of coordination in the two IT 
functions (Civit and Milit) focusing on three consecutive 
episodes. We will first discuss coordination under normal 
operating conditions. Then, we will discuss how coordina-
tion had changed after IT-related incidents that created 
emergency conditions. Subsequently, we present our analy-
sis of the period of time associated with the change: the 
shift in coordination practices as a result of an event that 
disrupts “business-as-usual.” As we demonstrate, while 
four coordination practices are evident under both normal 
and emergency conditions, the inter-relationships between 
these practices change when IT functions face emergency 
conditions.
Episode 1: coordination under normal 
conditions
Under normal conditions, Civit’s main priority is maintain-
ing 70,000 workstations and a multitude of IT systems. 
Incoming IT-related requests from clients (which can be 
internal within Civit, external within the MoD, or external 
Figure 2. The dynamics of coordination under emergency conditions.
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organizations) can be standard (e.g. setting up a new work-
station for a new employee), non-standard (e.g. request for 
a new custom-made application), or a specific project. For 
standard and non-standard requests, there are set rules and 
regulations regarding the time to deliver the requested 
need, based on the impact of the problem for the user of the 
system, giving clear guidelines on what steps or procedures 
to follow to fulfill the request. Priorities are discussed 
Table 4. Coordination practices and comprising activities under normal conditions.
Coordination 
practices
Activities comprising coordination practices
Civit IT function Milit IT function
Prioritizing tasks 
(what and when)
Using formal meetings to negotiate or 
impose priorities of tasks
Using Standard Requests, Non-
Standard Requests, and Projects
Using service-level agreements (SLAs) 
to set standards in solving problems
Using formal meetings and “morning prayers” to prioritize 
tasks
Using Standard Requests, Non-Standard Requests, and 
Projects
Using SLAs to set standards in solving problems for clients
Following procedures 
(what and how)
Following formal procedures and 
processes
Through ITIL, PRINCE, and SLAs
Relying on formal procedures, especially those concerned 
with confidential processes
Through ITIL, PRINCE, and SLAs
Using roles and 
responsibilities (what 
and who)
Relying on a person’s functional 
(formal) role (RACI matrix)
Using digital directories/databases to 
find relevant person according to their 
role/responsibility
Assigning tasks according to experience
Through meetings responsibilities are 
assigned to people
Relying on visual indicators such as person’s uniform which 
indicates background, experience, and rank to “interpret” 
their role/responsibility
Relying on person’s functional (formal) role
Using digital directories, for example, functional e-mail boxes
Assigning tasks according to experience with a specific client
Using “Morning prayers” to discuss and assign 
responsibilities
Utilizing networks 
(what, how, and 
who)
Following the formal and hierarchical 
lines
Using informal networks to “work 
around” the formal organization
Using formal networks that are associated with formal 
procedures
Using informal networks built through shared or similar 
experiences, assuring trust
ITIL: Information Technology Infrastructure Library; PRINCE: projects in controlled environments. 
The RACI matrix captures four key dimensions of involvement with a task: Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed.
Table 5. Coordination practices and comprising activities under emergency conditions.
Coordination 
practices
Activities comprising coordination practices
Civit IT function Milit IT function
Prioritizing tasks 
(what and when)
(Always) putting incidents and calamities first (no 
time to negotiate other priorities of tasks)
(Sometimes) exercising power to accelerate 
action: “the one who shouts the loudest”
Systems are used to register incidents, but do not 
prioritize them
Relying on formal mechanisms; putting incidents and 
accidents first
Conforming to highest in command who decides 




Using “carte blanche” (crisis mandate) to act own’s 
discretion to remove steps, “ignore” procedures
Looking for informal ways to resolve the situation 
(work around the formal line)
Relying on a very formal approach: plan-do-check-act
Relying on formal structures and protocols
Having zero tolerance for mistakes (attitude)
Using roles and 
responsibilities 
(what and who)
Institutionalizing crisis “functions”: crisis managers 
and escalation managers
Acting based on situation at hand and “who 
is available” (no time to formally assign 
responsibilities)
Using “carte blanche” to assigning people to a 
certain task
Following “command and control” which relies 
on exercising power based on rank and role and 
obeying orders (uniformity)
Responsibilities are associated with the uniform, the 
higher the rank, the more responsibilities
Using digital directories such as functional e-mail 




(Mainly) using informal networks to retrieve 
relevant knowledge as people do not have time to 
verify expertise or build trust
Reliance on “people we know and trust”
“Enforcing” utilization of formal networks only
Building trust through reliance on uniforms, rank, 
and formal military procedures
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during formal work meetings and tasks are carried out 
according to the set times. The Head of the Cluster Security 
& Identity at Civit elaborated about priorities for projects, 
and the impact on possible IS incidents:
Projects can also have a lot of priority and then you might have 
to get people to work late, put in extra hours. So if we do not 
comply with our current contracts, we decide that it’s better for 
the ministry so that 10,000 people cannot work because their 
account is not operational, for instance? So we need to consider 
priorities, of course. Our colleagues at Processes make those 
considerations, but I do not know if I always agree with the 
priorities they make. I think they are cutting back too much on 
regular maintenance, with the result that we will have more 
incidents and calamities in the future.
Milit employees often deal with similar requests as their 
Civit colleagues, but work within Milit usually concerns 
military-operation systems and clients who work in active 
military missions or training areas. For example,
If people, embassy employees for instance, get the equipment 
and stuff, they get it at the airport or at home, they get it and 
then they can take it with them. All missions, deployment 
missions, start with that. That’s all starting there. There we 
need to set up whole structures to ensure that everything that 
goes with crypto goes well. (Head of Information Security, 
Milit)
The way Milit employees deal with incoming requests is 
somewhat different from Civit (as evident from the list of 
activities included in Table 4). For example, Milit has so-
called morning prayers at several locations, where every 
morning at 7:45 AM, tasks and projects are discussed and 
priorities are set for both the short and long(-er) term.
Procedures play an important role in coordinating IT 
work and finding expertise required to execute different 
tasks. In Civit, employees are expected to follow formal 
procedures at all times. Procedures are institutionalized 
through ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library; a set of practices for IT service management that 
focuses on aligning IT services with the business), PRINCE 
(projects in controlled environments; a project manage-
ment methodology), as well as through securing deliveries 
to clients via SLAs.
Because of the nature of the military work, Milit has a 
zero-tolerance policy for mistakes regarding many proce-
dures. When it comes to classified projects or services, 
every step of the process must be followed “to the letter.” 
Access to secure networks and authorizations are among 
aspects that follow specific approval procedures. On the 
other hand, there are situations when Milit employees devi-
ate from formal SLAs in order to solve an urgent IS issue, 
based on experience of the people involved and their assess-
ment of the situation. This is illustrated in the following 
example of a situation when Milit received a non-standard 
(and complex) request that needed to be dealt with quickly 
and properly. This request came in at the operations room 
[the bridge] right before the millennium night of 30 
December 1999:
We discussed, weeks ahead of time, the controlled shutdown 
of the mainframe with our clients. We would shut down the 
systems and the applications at 22:00 and bring them back up 
at 2:00. Based on the letter we sent out to the helicopter group 
at D [City], which was back then still part of the Navy, I 
received a phone call from the colonel “we need to provide 
support and when the system is down, we can’t access our 
stock lists.” They need to know exactly what they have in 
stock, because equipment is certified and otherwise helicopters 
cannot fly. I proposed to download their information, burn it 
on a CD and send out a courier to them with stock information 
at 21:00 to consult during this night.
To coordinate IT work, members of Civit and Milit rely 
on knowledge about who-knows-what which they develop 
in a variety of ways, for instance through perceptions of 
relative expertise of others which are usually associated 
with formal roles and responsibilities, or through stereo-
typing. In Civit, assignment of roles and responsibilities is 
formalized through a hierarchical role index where a role is 
a descriptor of an associated set of tasks that can be per-
formed by many people and one person can perform many 
roles. This IT function relies on formalized procedures 
describing the person (the role) to contact for different 
issues or requests (e.g. if an employee is requesting a new 
desktop or application, the procedure would describe whom 
to contact and what form to fill in). Under normal circum-
stances, the assignment of a person to a task is based on 
their formal role and function and is matched with their 
expertise. Experience of the employee with the type of pro-
ject, or the client, also plays an important role. Within sev-
eral sub-functions of Civit, initiatives were put forward to 
capture all employees’ expertise, skills, and experiences 
with clients in a system combined with educational infor-
mation in order to facilitate the search for information.
In Milit, employees are recognizable according to their 
uniform, indicating from which Armed Forces Division 
(Navy, Army, or Air Force) they stem, and their “stars and 
stripes” indicate their rank. The uniform provides a good 
indication of a person’s background and experience, both in 
terms of the client information (as the uniform corresponds 
to the Armed Forces Division, which are all clients of the 
Milit) and years of experience within the Defense organiza-
tion (rank approximately indicates tenure in the Armed 
Forces), but not necessarily their specific role in the IT 
function (Milit). Under normal circumstances, Milit 
employees rely on formal roles that are associated with spe-
cific functions. Allocation of tasks can be both person-
based and expertise-based. In particular, when specific 
expertise is needed to address a high-priority issue, a fast 
response is expected when sending out an email with a 
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request for information to a functional email box instead of 
approaching a specific person. For example, as one Senior 
Project Manager at Milit explained,
In military departments, you almost always have functional 
e-mail boxes. You send a request for information not to 
someone, but to the e-mail box. So you don’t send an email to 
just one specialist, behind this e-mail box are usually several 
specialists and always one will answer immediately. This is the 
military principle.
In Milit, the most important aspect when assigning 
responsibilities to an employee is experience with a client 
(i.e. specific Armed Forces). It appears that this client-spe-
cific experience prevails over project- or task-domain spe-
cific experience within Milit. For instance, when two 
employees with similar product-domain knowledge (e.g. 
about a specific IT system) or project-domain knowledge 
(e.g. establishing connections with a mission area) are 
available, the one who has more client-specific experience 
is assigned to the job.
To coordinate work, employees in both IT functions rely 
extensively on networks. Within Civit, finding relevant 
expert relies primarily on formal networks. Civit institu-
tionalized a very formal system through which every step is 
monitored or “otherwise we lose control” (Process manager 
at Civit). At the same time, informal networks are also very 
important in Civit. As individuals work together on joint 
projects, they get to know one another and their areas of 
expertise, and they use this knowledge at a later stage to 
contact their peers when relevant expertise is required. 
Through such shared experiences, informal networks 
emerge. Indeed, some people are very active in forming 
informal networks across the IT function:
When I look at my own function [product group manager], I 
“network my ass off” to get the best possible informal and 
“like knows like” network. That also means I actively 
contribute to these networks. Anyone can call me at any time 
with questions such as “I have a problem; can you help me 
with this and that?,” “How would you do this?” (Product group 
manager at Civit)
In Civit, informal networks are used to get things done 
more quickly, while avoiding the formal hierarchy embed-
ded in the organizational structure and creating shortcuts. 
For example, one can send an informal message first noti-
fying the receiver that a formal request will follow. 
However, this is only done when people know each other. 
This function seems to be “stuck in its own formal process, 
that’s why we have a massive informal circuit” (Delivery 
manager at Civit).
In Milit both formal and informal networks are utilized 
by employees to find relevant expertise. In addition to net-
works that are built through shared collaborative experi-
ences, Milit employees often share similar experiences 
which are accumulated separately by having been at the 
same place or situation, rather than by active collaboration 
or shared past experiences, such as having followed the 
same military training, or having participated in the same 
military mission. Such common experiences are evoked by 
recognizing the same uniform or rank; there is an implica-
tion of trust and, to some extent, a perception of a similar 
expertise. These common experiences are used in informal 
as well as formal networks. Informal networks can be very 
useful in preparation for military operations, as illustrated 
in this example:
On Saturday, the Arab League called upon the UN Security 
Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. During the UN 
Security Council meeting on Tuesday, Lebanon tabled a 
resolution for a no-fly zone to be imposed over Libya. Actually, 
one day earlier, on Monday, the [informal] call came in at Milit 
that the European Country’s Air Forces probably would 
support the enforcement of this resolution. They [Milit] had 
already started with the preparation of IT necessities for fighter 
jets, even though there was no formal assignment yet. I was 
happy we’d already started with the preparations, because on 
Thursday, the formal assignment did come in and that same 
weekend we already had to send gear in that direction. Had we 
not started on Monday, we would never have made it on time. 
(Head of Knowledge Pool at Milit)
Summarizing inter-relationships between coordination practices 
in Episode 1. Under normal operating conditions, priorities 
of tasks are defined by those having formal roles to do so, 
and those priorities are accomplished in accordance with 
the procedures at hand. At the same time, following these 
procedures defines the priority of (other but related) tasks. 
Formal roles that are captured in the organizational struc-
tures of the IT functions (Civit and Milit) define hierarchy 
which is followed when coordinating via formal networks. 
Consequently, individuals rely on formal roles and associ-
ated responsibilities to find colleagues with relevant exper-
tise. Informal networks are used occasionally to “work 
around” the formal procedures to speed things up. Figure 1 
depicts the dynamics of coordination in both IT functions 
under normal conditions.
There is, however, one difference between the two IT 
functions in terms of the way the roles and responsibilities 
are relied on and interpreted through the networks. Milit 
employees are often able to “interpret” what experience 
and responsibilities their colleagues have by looking at 
their uniform, which shows the Armed Forces Division 
(e.g. Navy or Air Force) and their rank. A uniform, how-
ever, does not give any indication of a person’s specific 
level of expertise or knowledge related to IT services. In 
that regard, civilian and military employees are in the same 
position, utilizing inter-personal relationships and aware-
ness about specific expertise of their colleagues, when rely-
ing on informal networks to coordinate work faster. Based 
on this analysis, Table 4 provides an overview of activities 
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that constitute coordination practices in the two IT func-
tions under normal conditions.
In the next episode, we discuss in detail how Civit and 
Milit coordinate work under emergency conditions.
Episode 2: coordination under emergency 
conditions
When Civit employees are dealing with an emergency situ-
ation, they need to address the issue quickly to avoid fur-
ther disaster. Therefore, tasks associated with resolving the 
emergency situation become the first priority. For example, 
when a whole system shuts down and thousands of employ-
ees are without a network connection, priorities on standard 
and non-standard requests and projects are put aside and 
the situation at hand becomes the focus of all activities. 
Thus, coordination efforts are focused on finding experts 
that could help to resolve the emergency situation. What 
sometimes happens within Civit is that, due to time pres-
sure and busy schedules, during formal meetings some pri-
orities are misaligned with reality or overlooked. As one of 
the product managers at Civit noted,
No one sets priorities, everybody keeps shouting, emailing, and 
calling and, in the end, no decisions are made. Some tasks are 
ignored under pressure, like extensive maintenance of systems. 
You can compare this with your car: if it needs a check-up, it 
does not need to be done right now, you can also do it next 
week. With IT networks we see the same thing: it does not need 
to be done right now, we can do it next week. If you do this one 
too many times and you postpone half a year with your check-up 
at the garage, you’ll find yourself one morning with a low 
battery, your car won’t start. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to set priorities and control this process.
What happens is that certain tasks remain “on the shelf” 
until they become the source of an incident. Then they 
receive a red flag, become a calamity, and suddenly rise to 
the top of the to-do list of Civit. As a Process manager at 
Civit commented, “We have elevated crises, even if they 
aren’t, we are crisis-oriented to get things done around 
here.” Indeed, as a Unit Manager in Civit explained, creat-
ing (sometimes artificially) an incident or calamity is the 
way to speed up things:
I’ve also talked with a lot of people and what I hear very much 
within I & S is that it’s very formal and it’s very bureaucratic 
and it’s slow, it’s very slow. What it actually means that it’s 
very difficult to match priorities for standard and non-standard 
projects. So, when something really has to be done, it’s easier 
or more effective to make it an incident or a calamity, because 
then people will start running. So what that means is, we call 
“fire” earlier than we used to, because then it works. Yes, in 
practice it often works that way. The only thing is, I think very 
often that a calamity or incident is created or called, without it 
being real. So at a certain moment, there’s this feeling of “oh, 
it’s probably not so bad”—you get used to it. So then, every 
time it needs to be presented as more serious, and there’s an 
upper limit to that as well. So yes, we have an escalation 
manager, and that’s not necessarily a bad thing, but why do we 
have an escalation manager?—because in the hierarchical line, 
in the regular organization, people just don’t succeed in 
coordinating things properly, taking responsibility, making 
decisions. That’s why we now have an escalation manager, and 
that’s where we need to bring those incidents.
In Milit, in a state of emergency, tasks associated with 
the emergency situation must be carried out immediately, 
putting ongoing tasks and projects on hold. Prioritizing 
tasks in Milit is driven by the importance or severity of a 
situation associated with a specific client. Milit internally 
refers to this as a “client-based perspective.” For example, 
one router that is malfunctioning leaving only one agent in 
the military activity zone without a connection may be 
much more important than a malfunctioning router that 
serves 50 individuals on the safe base. As the Head of 
Operations Room at Milit explained,
You should not assess the situation based on whether this is 
one workstation that does not work, or here we have 20 
workstations that do not work. No, you should keep the client 
perspective in mind and assess the importance of the situation 
and when that single workstation is more important than those 
other 20, then those 20 will just have to wait a little while. If 
you look at it from an IT network perspective, and you have 
never been on a mission and don’t know the backgrounds, you 
only see 20 people without a connection and you think that 
needs to be solved first.
In contrast to Civit, where prioritization in emergency 
situations becomes an issue, in Milit the highest in rank 
usually decides what to do, and instructs the others down 
the pyramid accordingly. However, decision-makers do lis-
ten to the experts when it comes to dealing with certain 
situations; thus if possible, the decision is agreed on by, or 
verified with, the expert on the topic.
In Civit, when dealing with an emergency situation, 
“formal procedures are put overboard” (as one interviewee 
put it); as in the earlier emergency example where a new 
cooler for a data center was flown in within a day, while 
the actual replacement procedure was to go through a long 
tender process. In Civit, there is a sort of “carte blanche” 
(i.e. unrestricted power to act at one’s own discretion, also 
referred to as a crisis mandate) in crisis situations, which 
means that “we don’t have to go through 16 steps before 
reaching an approval state” (Senior project manager at 
Civit). This means that formal procedures of Civit that are 
designed for dealing with “normal” IT requests and inci-
dents break down in emergency situations when urgent 
action is required. However, there are no emergency pro-
cedures to kick in under such circumstances. Therefore, 
formal procedures are replaced by shorter, much more 
informal ad hoc actions aimed at resolving the incident by 
any means possible.
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Different from Civit’s approach to coordination under 
emergencies, Milit follows the military way of doing things 
under emergency conditions as illustrated by a Senior pro-
gram manager at Milit: “Under emergency circumstances 
it’s important to go through the plan-do-check-act phases as 
quickly as possible, in order to stay ahead of your oppo-
nent.” In emergency situations, military employees greatly 
rely on formal structures and protocols. So where, in Civit, 
the plan-do-check-act cycle is being reduced by removing 
steps, people and parts from the normal procedures, in Milit 
the principle is to follow the procedures (even more) “to the 
letter,” only much quicker. Hence, coordinating work to 
resolve emergency situations and address urgent IT requests 
is a highly formalized and efficient process within Milit. 
Specifically, the way in which Milit personnel use these 
formal procedures is closely linked to the formalization of 
roles and networks that are utilized.
Civit, being a large IT function with many hierarchical 
layers, formalized a number of crisis roles such as “crisis 
manager” and “escalation manager,” which have been insti-
tutionalized to deal with emergency/crisis situations. These 
crisis roles come on the top of other (normal) responsibili-
ties that these (usually higher-/management-level) individ-
uals deal with on a daily basis. The person in this role is the 
first to be contacted in case of an emergency and s/he 
becomes the main contact point until emergency is resolved. 
As one interviewee elaborated,
We got these escalation managers because we saw that people 
down the line were not well connected and did not take, or did 
not dare to take on responsibilities. So now we have a 
“location” to bring our trouble to. However, this actually does 
not resolve anything, because these people also have to fine-
tune decisions “along the line.” (Unit manager at Civit)
One escalation manager described his role as: “I am a 
hub, connecting people, building bridges, connecting peo-
ple, resolving issues.” He explained that he knows that he 
cannot act under time pressure in situations that are too 
complex, but he is active in managing part of the complex-
ity of situations within the organization. Some of these cri-
sis managers are the only ones who can “wake up” the 
entire organization in case of an emergency.
As the crisis mandate effectuates, there is a “carte 
blanche” when it comes to assigning people to a certain 
task, if they are considered to have relevant knowledge to 
get things done. In an emergency, formal rules and proce-
dures do not apply anymore, as action needs to be taken 
immediately—otherwise the impact of the incident or 
calamity can be disastrous. The need to avoid a disaster 
may foster collaboration between individuals who join their 
efforts in trying to address one common goal. For example, 
as a product group manager at Civit explained,
What happens is that all of a sudden there is room for 
cooperation, sharing knowledge and coming to a joint solution, 
where before everyone was only looking at their own piece of 
responsibility.
When Milit is dealing with an emergency situation, the 
reliance on roles and responsibilities within this IT function 
shifts from a formal cooperation mode to “hierarchy and 
command.” As one of the interviewees illustrated,
First your name is just Ralph, and I am Captain Brian. Suddenly 
things do not work anymore and then the boss says “Lieutenant 
Stacey.” It is at that moment when he calls you by your rank 
and last name, that he invokes his rank and you have sworn to 
blindly follow a higher rank. (Senior technical specialist at 
Milit)
There is a clear formalization in case of an emergency. 
The example given under normal circumstances about the 
functional e-mail boxes also applies here; Milit has institu-
tionalized several mechanisms to assure a direct response 
when faced with an emergency. Milit is a 24/7 organization, 
employees are trained for and used to this context and rely 
on their formal roles to deal with emergencies.
When employees in Civit feel that a certain situation 
escalates to a state of emergency, they seem to rely mainly 
on their personal informal networks to quickly access rel-
evant knowledge. Since emergencies require rapid action 
and there is no time to verify expertise and get approvals 
through the formal procedures, people can only go to 
those colleagues they know and trust as an expert in a 
particular area. Considering the crisis mandate explained 
earlier, the formal procedures are avoided in order to get 
access to the right expertise quickly. Therefore, informal 
networks are key when coordinating during emergency 
situations in Civit.
In Milit, according to the military principle (captured in 
the Code of Conduct to which military employees swear to 
obey), obeying orders and following procedures are key 
when dealing with emergency situations. In accordance 
with this principle, the formalized way of coordinating 
work is evident in Milit during the emergency state. 
Employees follow strict instructions in complex situations 
and do not deviate from the formal line of command. In 
contrast to Civit where formal networks are replaced by 
informal ones under emergency situations, in Milit formal 
networks become even stricter as staff purely rely on ranks 
and the hierarchical chain of command. Ranks and military 
protocols define who is in charge in emergency situations 
and who is following whose command. Who-knows-whom 
and inter-personal relationships are abandoned and only 
orders and protocols invoked through the formal chain of 
command are followed.
Summarizing inter-relationships between coordination practices 
in Episode 2. Under emergency operating conditions, the 
dynamics between coordination practices unfold differ-
ently in Civit and Milit (see Figure 2). Triggered by a 
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serious IS incident, in the traditional IT function (Civit), the 
priority of tasks changes so that all coordination efforts are 
focused on dealing with the incident that has caused the 
emergency. Avoiding further disaster and returning to busi-
ness-as-usual becomes the main priority. This priority, in 
turn, invokes different roles (such as escalation and crisis 
manager) that mobilize individuals affected by the emer-
gency, and these individuals attempt to resolve the emer-
gency by coordinating in an ad hoc, improvised manner, 
heavily relying on informal networks, ignoring or adjust-
ing formal procedures and deciding on which procedures 
(not) to follow. In contrast, in the fast-response IT function 
(Milit), an event that triggers an emergency situation 
invokes formal and hierarchical roles based on military 
ranks that, in turn, switch to coordination based on emer-
gency protocols, and obeying orders based on a command 
and control framework. Ranks and accompanying responsi-
bilities are never questioned. The higher in command 
defines the priority of tasks which, in turn, invoke relevant 
emergency protocols and procedures. The coordination 
efforts are concentrated on following emergency proce-
dures. Military rank defines the chain of command in for-
mal networks. Then orders and emergency procedures are 
followed to find relevant experts and coordinate their 
actions. Thus, the way Milit accomplishes its mission in an 
emergency situation is through its military doctrine which 
prescribes order, uniformity, and control on all operational 
levels with a zero-tolerance to any forms of misconduct or 
deviations from formal procedures. Deviation from the 
command and control framework could potentially lead to 
disaster (Farrell et al., 2013). These inter-dependencies 
between coordination practices are captured in Figure 2, 
which illustrates how coordination unfolds under emer-
gency operating conditions in Civit and Milit.
Derived from the analysis presented above, Table 5 pro-
vides an overview of activities that constitute coordination 
practices in the two IT functions under emergency 
conditions.
In the next episode, we focus on the change in coordina-
tion practices when IT functions face emergency condi-
tions. We conceptualize this change as a “shift.”
Episode 3: the shift—responding to an 
event until “emergency” state is established
This episode is describing a period of time which is substan-
tially shorter than those depicted in episodes 1 and 2 where 
we discuss how the coordination process unfolds under nor-
mal and emergency conditions. However, it is crucial to 
understand how the shift in coordination occurs in traditional 
and fast-response IT support functions (Civit and Milit, 
respectively), that is, what happens after normal operating 
conditions are disrupted until an emergency state is declared. 
Our analysis of events that disrupt the normal state illustrates 
that in Milit there is a clear vision of what constitutes an 
“emergency” and therefore requires urgent action. Such 
events include IT issues/incidents during a military operation 
(in a war zone); projects requesting to provide IT support in 
preparation for a mission; urgent IT problems that happen 
during a mission or exercise; IS incidents or problems in 
what is referred to as “active networks” (i.e. in the field); 
serious IT issues that can cause a security breach; and life-
threatening situations that can become an emergency if not 
addressed as a matter of urgency. These events (illustrated by 
exemplar quotes in Table 6) trigger enactment of the emer-
gency state, which happens momentarily.
In Civit, there is no such clear shift from a normal to an 
emergency state. Events that disrupt business-as-usual in 
Civit are not considered immediately as emergencies but 
rather escalate or lead to further disruptions until they become 
a “crisis situation” or “calamity.” Thus, different from Milit 
where certain events trigger the shift to a state of emergency, 
in Civit events typically lead to a state of emergency over 
time. Such events include unknown IS incidents that turn into 
a problem; systems being down (i.e. “important IT unavaila-
ble for lots of people”); a serious incident that causes systems 
breakdown and becomes a calamity; IT failures that become 
high-priority issues; IS incidents that escalate; IT requests 
that are escalated because they cannot be accomplished in 
time according to SLAs; and high-priority assignments due to 
resourcing constraints. Categories of these events are illus-
trated in Table 7 and illustrated by exemplary quotes.
An event that disrupts the normal state invokes changes in 
coordination practices, and the way these changes take shape 
differ substantially between the two IT functions. When an 
incident disrupts the normal functioning of Civit, this is man-
ifested in a breakdown in “normal” coordination practices. It 
takes some time for Civit to establish the extent of an emer-
gency (e.g. how many and which clients of the IT function 
are affected and whether the situation is still unfolding and 
could lead to further disaster) and to adjust existing coordi-
nation mechanisms (or put in place new ones) that would 
resolve the situation so that Civit can go back to “business-
as-usual.” The earlier example (in Table 3) of a severe acci-
dent when two air generators of the data center broke down 
portrays a situation when unfolding events (breakdown of 
one air generator after another) made this incident evolve 
into an emergency as the second air generator stopped work-
ing. It took time for Civit to realize the severity of the evolv-
ing situation and to establish that following the formal 
procedure (tender process) would not allow resolving the 
situation. They acknowledged the state of emergency and 
started looking for ways to repair or replace the generator(s). 
At the end, an expert was flown from another European 
country, as well as a new air generator.
When Milit is facing an event that is considered as a trig-
ger for a shift to an emergency state, Milit acts quickly. In 
such situations, whether it was planned in advance (e.g. a 
military operation) or happened unexpectedly (e.g. a sud-
den IT breakdown), lives of soldiers deployed are at stake, 
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and as there is a need to ensure that rival forces cannot 
access secret and classified information. Therefore, in 
Milit, the shift from normal to emergency operating condi-
tions happens instantaneously. As the state of emergency is 
declared, military ranks are invoked and Milit switches to 
an operating mode according to the formal command and 
control framework guided by military principles.
Discussion
This study aimed to theorize about how organizational IT 
functions coordinate their work under different degrees of 
uncertainty in order to provide reliable IT services. Specifically, 
our empirical investigation focused on understanding how the 
coordination practices that IT functions employ to provide 
reliable IT services change when IT incidents cause a change 
from normal (i.e. “business-as-usual”) to emergency condi-
tions. We conceptualized IT functions’ responses to an emer-
gency as a “shift” of coordination practices and analyzed how 
such a shift actually happens, leading to change in coordina-
tion practices employed under different levels of uncertainty.
Coordination dynamics in IT support 
functions: toward a process view
We theorize coordination in IT support functions as a pro-
cess that unfolds over time through interactions between 
the four underlying coordination practices: prioritizing 
tasks, following procedures, using roles and responsibili-
ties, and utilizing networks. Nevertheless, each practice 
may be enacted in various ways, that is, through a reper-
toire of different coordinative activities (summarized in 
Tables 4 and 5). The nature of the activities constituting 
each practice (i.e. whether they are prescribed or ad hoc) 
signals whether a practice supports structured or impro-
vised coordination modes (Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Kotlarsky 
et al., 2014), as we discuss later in this section. Analyzing 
how the shift from normal to emergency operating condi-
tions happens helps to understand the differences in the 
level of preparedness of an IT support function to respond 
to emergencies and restore reliable IT services.
When an event triggers change in the operating condi-
tions from normal to emergency, coordination practices used 
under normal conditions become unsuitable, which prompts 
the IT function to switch to alternative ways of coordinating. 
In the fast-response IT support function, this alternative con-
sists of a pre-defined “emergency” set of practices, while in 
the traditional IT support function alternative practices are 
largely based on improvisation (see Table 8).
Figure 3 captures coordination as a process that, when 
affected by changes in operating conditions, shifts from a 
normal to an emergency state and then returns to business-
as-usual after the emergency has been addressed and relia-
ble IT services have been restored. This high-level process 
view highlights the difference in the time-line between 
traditional versus fast-response IT support functions in the 
occurrence of such a shift. Furthermore, this view also helps 
identify the key characteristics of the shift that leads the tra-
ditional IT function to pursue improvised coordination, 
while the fast-response IT function resorts to emergency 
coordination practices. As events originating in an external 
environment (e.g. changes in the geo-political situation) or 
internal reasons (e.g. unexpected equipment failure or criti-
cal organizational missions) affect the functioning of the 
organization, the IT function is put under pressure to resolve 
the issue. In response to emergency situations, the IT func-
tion engages in coordination practices that are suitable to 
address these urgent needs. These practices are inter-related 
either by defining, following, deciding, or prescribing 
another practice (as discussed in episodes 1 and 2 and illus-
trated by different configurations of coordination practices 
that both IT functions enact in normal operating conditions 
and when dealing with emergencies in Figures 1 and 2).
Comparing coordination dynamics in 
traditional and fast-response IT support 
functions
Analyses of the interactions between coordination prac-
tices (illustrated in Figures 1 and 2) demonstrate different 
dynamics between coordination practices under different 
operating conditions, resulting in different configura-
tions—one that captures coordination during normal oper-
ating conditions (e.g. Figure 1) and the other that reflects 
how work in an IT support function is coordinated in the 
case of an emergency (e.g. the two diagrams in Figure 2). 
Essentially, the analyses presented in the previous sections 
of this article indicate that, in terms of coordination, a fast-
response IT function reacts quite differently to a shift to an 
emergency state than a traditional IT function. A fast-
response IT function is more prepared for emergencies, as 
it has a set of well-structured mechanisms that define how 
work is to be coordinated under such circumstances. 
Employees in such IT functions are familiar with both sets 
of coordination practices (i.e. business-as-usual as well as 
emergency practices) and are trained to switch between the 
two when operating conditions change. In particular, when 
a fast-response IT function faces an emergency, the already 
formal ways of coordinating work become even more for-
mal and tight, removing any possible ambiguity that could 
potentially harm the ability of this IT function to achieve 
its goals. Informal networks are no longer utilized, and 
higher ranks define the priority of tasks which in turn 
defines how work should be coordinated: guided by formal 
protocols, procedures, and codes of conduct. Overall, as 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the inter-relationships 
between different coordination practices remain largely 
the same when operating conditions in a fast-response IT 
function shift from normal to emergency, but the enact-
ment of each practice (which takes place through a 
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Table 8. Main characteristics of the coordination process under normal and emergency operating conditions in traditional and fast-
response IT support functions.




Largely structured coordination practices
Personal networks are used to speed 
things up
Largely improvised and informal coordination practices aimed at 
resolving the emergency (as “normal” procedures and protocols are 
not able to address emergency situations and there are no/minimal 
emergency procedures in place)
Personal networks are dominant, which
(+) allows for ad hoc collaborations, but




Largely structured coordination practices
Informal networks rely on joint 
experiences and visual indicators (i.e. 
uniform) indicating similar experiences
Highly structured and formal coordination practices aimed at 
achieving best performance (these practices rely on a specific set of 
“emergency” protocols, procedures, and other activities that are 
evoked in emergency situations and followed strictly)
Informal networks cease to exist which means that
(+) coordination is highly efficient, but
(–) no room for discussion
(+) and (–) in this table stands for pros and cons (accordingly).
Figure 3. Coordination process in traditional and fast-response IT support functions.
portfolio of specific coordinative activities associated with 
each practice) changes significantly, as the set of activities 
for normal conditions is replaced by the set of activities for 
emergency conditions (see the activities listed in Table 5).
On the contrary, when a traditional IT function faces an 
emergency situation, structures and formalities (procedures, 
rules, and regulations) that define how work is coordinated 
under normal conditions fall apart. An incident or break-
down that leads to an emergency requires a re-assessment of 
priorities and amplifies the need to remove all formal organ-
izational boundaries to allow efficient coordination in order 
to resolve the emergency and restore reliable IT services. 
Informal networks become the main driver of coordination, 
as individuals rely extensively on their personal networks to 
find relevant experts and bring them together in an attempt 
to resolve the emergency. As formal coordination mecha-
nisms largely dissolve, there is space for creativity and 
improvisation in coming up with solutions for the crisis. 
Having a carte blanche, for example, is one way to legiti-
mize the lack of structure and formal approaches for coordi-
nating work. In Table 8, we summarize the main 
characteristics of the coordination process where we distin-
guish between normal and emergency operating conditions 
in traditional and fast-response IT support functions.
Kotlarsky et al. 115
As depicted in Table 8, in the traditional IT support 
function, a largely structured way of coordinating work 
under normal conditions shifts to largely improvised and 
informal when faced with an emergency. In contrast, in the 
fast-response IT support function, the largely structured 
approach to coordination that we observed in normal situa-
tions changes to highly structured and formal under emer-
gency conditions.
Explaining different coordination dynamics: 
the nature of an emergency and integrating 
conditions for coordination
An important conclusion that we can draw from the previ-
ous discussion is that traditional IT functions are less pre-
pared for emergencies than fast-response ones. In this 
section, we integrate our findings with the literature to 
explain this phenomenon in more detail and explore how IT 
support functions in traditional organizations could shape 
their coordination process in a way that is better prepared 
for responding to emergency conditions so that reliable IT 
services can be restored after emergencies occur.
First, we need to consider how IT functions in different 
types of organizations perceive an “emergency.” We 
defined an emergency operating condition as “a situation 
that (1) contains pervasive uncertainty; (2) creates pressure 
for quick execution; and (3) can have negative conse-
quences such as additional costs or creates a danger of 
severe physical harm.” The fast-response IT support func-
tion in our study is similar to SWAT and police teams as 
studied by Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) and Schakel et al. 
(2016) in the sense that it had mechanisms in place to adapt 
coordination practices to the requirements of an emergency. 
In our study, the IT function supporting the Military divi-
sion of the MoD was prepared for dealing with new, uncer-
tain, and unexpected situations through formalization. The 
traditional IT function, on the other hand, was clearly not 
prepared for surprises, and any “discrepant IT events” (de 
Guinea and Webster, 2013) that would fall outside what 
would be considered within this function as “normal acci-
dents” (Perrow, 1999) or typical IT projects could create a 
challenge for coordinating IT work. In this function, the 
lack of structured and pre-defined coordination practices 
for emergency situations was compensated for by having 
specific crisis manager and escalation manager roles that 
were only invoked in an emergency situation. As there were 
no established structures or processes on which these roles 
could rely, however, their actions were by definition ad hoc 
and improvised, without sufficient opportunity for adapting 
“normal” coordination practices to the requirements of 
emergency situations.
These findings are in line with Bigley and Roberts’ 
(2001) conclusions that traditional systems cannot be relied 
on when faced with an emergency situation. In response to 
such a situation, a traditional organization tries to achieve 
flexibility through improvisation and temporary arrange-
ments. For instance, in the analysis of the Mann Gulch dis-
aster, Weick (1993) highlighted the importance of role 
improvisations. He argued that “the collapse of role sys-
tems need not result in disaster if people develop skills in 
improvisation and bricolage” (p. 639). However, it is 
important to note that the traditional IT function in our 
study had to improvise because it did not have a choice, and 
not because it had an inherent ability to engage in organiza-
tional improvisation (Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011).
Interestingly, the way that the fast-response IT support 
function in our study responded to emergencies is not 
entirely in line with how, for instance, the SWAT team in 
Bechky and Okhuysen’s (2011) study reacted by improvis-
ing or relying on “organizational bricolage” practices such 
as role-shifting, reorganizing routines, and reassembling 
their work in response to specific situational demands. 
Instead, the fast-response IT function in our study relied on 
formalization through bureaucratic mechanisms such as 
command and control to cope with emergencies, essentially 
exhibiting some similarity to what Bigley and Roberts 
(2001) called an Incident Command System-based organi-
zation, providing the ability to “capitalize on command and 
control benefits of bureaucracy, while avoiding or over-
coming the considerable tendencies towards inertia” by, for 
instance, leaving room for constrained improvisation 
(Bigley and Roberts, 2001: 1281).
A possible explanation for the differences between fast-
response and traditional IT support functions in terms of the 
“readiness” of their coordination process for emergencies 
can be provided by analyzing the differences in integrating 
conditions for coordination as proposed by Okhuysen and 
Bechky (2009). These authors argued that successful coor-
dination is likely if (some or all of) three integrating condi-
tions are met: accountability (who is responsible for specific 
elements of the task?), predictability (what subtasks make 
up larger tasks and in what order will they be performed?), 
and common understanding (what is the shared perspective 
on the task, and how does an individual’s work fit into the 
whole?). These integrating conditions for coordination of 
work are relevant to knowledge-intensive work in IT sup-
port function.
Specifically, the accountability condition is met when 
members of IT support function are clear regarding respon-
sibilities of interdependent parties (including their own), 
which helps to set the right expectations. Predictability is 
achieved when organizational members are able to antici-
pate when and how interdependent actors would act, which 
allows individuals to plan and perform their own actions. 
Finally, common understanding is high when interdepend-
ent actors share knowledge of the whole IT project or issue 
that they are contributing to: what needs to be done, how it 
is to take place, the overall goals and objectives. 
Understanding a broader context and having a shared per-
spective helps individuals to fit their work within the whole.
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As we have observed in our study, four coordination 
practices—using roles and responsibilities, prioritizing 
tasks, utilizing networks, and following procedures—con-
tribute toward creating these integrating conditions for coor-
dinating of work when both traditional and fast-response IT 
functions operate under normal conditions. Specifically, 
roles and responsibilities facilitate accountability; priority 
of tasks and procedures help to predict what should happen 
next and how it should happen; and networks, which rely on 
familiarity between organizational members, increase com-
mon understanding between individuals.
Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) viewed integrating con-
ditions for coordination as an outcome of coordinative 
efforts which can be accomplished through a variety of 
mechanisms that combine formal planned mechanisms and 
emergent interactions. In line with this view, we can 
explain why, despite a variety in the repertoire of coordina-
tive actions that the fast-response and traditional IT sup-
port functions in our study employed to coordinate their 
work (depicted in Tables 4 and 5), both functions were able 
to meet the three integrating conditions to support coordi-
nation under normal operating conditions. Among the four 
coordination practices, utilizing networks introduced an 
informal element supporting emergent interactions based 
on familiarity, which is considered to be a key for achiev-
ing predictability and common understanding. Where, in 
the traditional IT function, familiarity relied on inter-per-
sonal relationships and past experiences of working 
together, familiarity in the fast-response IT function was 
embodied in the military uniform—as color of the uniform 
and rank implied certain experiences which colleagues 
could easily interpret and associate with. Furthermore, the 
fast-response IT function had a stronger social identity due 
to the fact that most employees were military personnel, 
which facilitated coordination by promoting a thorough 
consideration of another’s knowledge (Kane, 2010).
However, an event that triggered an emergency situa-
tion eroded integrating conditions for coordinating work 
that were appropriate for coordinating under normal condi-
tions. Despite the fact that both IT functions enacted a dif-
ferent set of coordination mechanisms when dealing with 
emergencies, the fast-response IT function was able to re-
create integrating conditions through the use of alternative 
(emergency-specific) coordinative activities such as rely-
ing on military rank and associated hierarchy, enacting 
emer-gency procedures and relying on the formal network. 
Accountability was enforced through the formal hierarchy 
and regimented nature of the unit, and common under-
standing was maintained by the regiment following mili-
tary principles captured in the code of conduct and known 
to all personnel, which in turn helped to manage expecta-
tions, to anticipate actions of others, and to increase pre-
dictability by defining the order. As noted above, changes 
in coordination practices we have identified in the fast-
response IT function resemble an Incident Command 
System (Bigley and Roberts, 2001) invoked in response to 
an emergency. Such a system ensures that the integrating 
conditions for coordination are met, as it leaves no room 
for doubt about who is responsible for what, what the 
shared principles are, and what actions are to be expected.
The traditional IT function, however, struggled to re-
create integrating conditions to support coordination under 
emergency conditions. Two emergency-specific roles—
escalation and crisis managers—seemed to be insufficient 
to re-create accountability as all other “normal” roles dis-
solved, which led to situations where the “one who shouts 
the loudest” was able to attract the attention of top man-
agement and determine the prioritizing of tasks. Replacing 
formal networks with informal ones increased the reliance 
on familiarity embodied in these informal networks as one 
of the main coordination mechanisms (e.g. to negotiate 
responsibilities when dealing with an emergency and 
decide on how to proceed in the absence of suitable formal 
procedures). Thus, relying on who knows whom and what 
they know about each other became the main driver behind 
the improvised (ad hoc) efforts to accomplish coordination 
in this IT function. This limited the possibility to achieve 
common understanding and predictability to small groups 
of people who were familiar with each other and therefore 
connected through informal networks.
To conclude, we believe that the integrating conditions 
for coordination help us to understand whether (or not) an 
IT support function is prepared to face the unexpected and 
deal with “discrepant IT events” (de Guinea and Webster, 
2013) and could help traditional IT functions to improve 
their ability to ensure reliable provision of IT systems and 
services under emergency conditions.
Theoretical implications
Our research offers significant implications for theory. First 
and foremost, it contributes to the literature that addresses 
problems facing the IT function (Rai, 2016), a topic which 
is central to the IS research agenda. At present, theoretical 
developments advancing our knowledge about the role and 
contribution of the IT function are at a nascent stage, focus-
ing on the way the IT function combines different roles in 
order to meet business needs—varying from providing reli-
able systems to leading business innovation (Guillemette 
et al., 2017; Guillemette and Paré, 2012; Tarafdar and 
Tanriverdi, 2018)—and the organizing challenges that 
emerge in relation to this combination of roles (Gregory 
et al., 2015; Haffke et al., 2017; Kude et al., 2017; Peppard, 
2018). Our study contributes to this stream of IS literature 
by specifically focusing on how the IT function responds to 
incidents to restore reliable service provision and by offer-
ing a more refined understanding of the process through 
which IT functions coordinate work in order to support 
organizational IT needs (Guillemette and Paré, 2012) and 
address the problem of reliability of IS (Butler and Gray, 
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2006). Our unique contribution is in theorizing coordina-
tion in the IT support function as a dynamic process that 
changes as an IT function is confronted with emergency 
conditions. Specifically, we (1) conceptualize coordination 
in IT support function as a process that unfolds over time 
through interactions between the four underlying coordina-
tion practices: prioritizing tasks, following procedures, 
using roles and responsibilities, and utilizing networks, and 
(2) show how these coordination practices that IT functions 
employ to provide reliable IT services change when IT inci-
dents cause a shift from normal (i.e. “business-as-usual”) to 
emergency conditions.
This brings to the fore the need to take into account 
changes in the conditions under which the IT function is 
expected to provide support to the organization. In an era 
when technologies have become a backbone and life blood 
of most organizations, IS incidents of different severity dis-
rupt business-as-usual and often put immense pressure on 
the IT support function. Therefore, being prepared for emer-
gencies means being able to mobilize and adjust the coordi-
nation of IT work to provide reliable IT services even when 
faced with emergency situations. Capturing the shift in 
coordination between normal and emergency operating con-
ditions depicted in our process view (Figure 3) is an impor-
tant aspect of our theoretical contribution, as it highlights 
that there is a variation between how different IT support 
functions respond to events that disrupt “business-as-usual.” 
Moreover, categorizing a variety of events that are consid-
ered as triggering an instant shift to an emergency state (in 
fast-response IS function) or eventually (or very likely) 
leading to emergency (in traditional IT functions) is a small 
but novel contribution that is relevant to our understanding 
of IS incidents.
Our second contribution is in distinguishing between IT 
functions supporting traditional and fast-response organi-
zations and demonstrating that while there is a single base-
line depicting coordination in both types of IT functions 
under normal operating conditions, IT functions in two dif-
ferent types of organizations respond to emergencies differ-
ently, as captured in the process view (Figure 3). This 
contributes to the stream of research on different approaches 
that IT functions have toward handling incidents and 
achieving reliable IT performance. Butler and Gray (2006) 
distinguish two strategies that IT functions follow to 
achieve reliable performance: routine-based reliability ver-
sus mindfulness-based reliability, implying two different 
ways of handling IS incidents. Routine-based reliability 
implies a focus on “repeatable packages of decision rules 
and associated actions” (Butler and Gray, 2006: 214) to 
handle incidents, with a focus on a reduction of errors, and 
on preventing and preparing for incidents. “Mindfulness-
based reliability,” however, implies a more agile and 
responsive way of handling incidents, with a focus on resil-
ience: the ability to cope with incidents as they arise, based 
on quick detection and analysis of incidents, and the 
capacity to make quick and accurate decisions in response 
to such incidents. Our study indicates the importance of 
considering the nature of the organization the IT function 
serves (traditional vs fast-response) and the operating con-
ditions (business-as-usual vs emergency) to explain how an 
IT function most effectively responds to a shift from busi-
ness-as-usual to emergency operating conditions: where 
the routine-based reliability approach that characterizes the 
IT function in the traditional organization falls apart and 
leads to what Butler and Gray call “mindless behavior” 
(being unable to handle incidents that do not fall into the 
established categories and strategies), an IT function in a 
fast-response organization is much more geared toward 
resilience and flexibility within the constraints of a clear 
command and control structure.
Practical implications
Clearly, a non-military IT function cannot become as strict 
as a military one when it comes to relying on ranks and for-
mal hierarchy. However, an IT function can consider other 
ways to re-create accountability, predictability, and common 
understanding, such as expanding “emergency” roles 
beyond emergency and crisis managers to include some 
supporting inter-disciplinary (e.g. cross-departmental) roles 
to act as boundary spanners (Gittell, 2002) and to help in 
channeling relevant knowledge between individuals and 
groups involved in dealing with the emergency. In particu-
lar, IT functions in fast-response organizations, such as 
A&E units in hospitals or air traffic control centers, should 
consider what can they learn from IT functions supporting 
military types of organization. For example, when a patient 
is on the operating table, supporting IS are critical, just like 
when a platoon is in a combat zone. Beyond hospitals, other 
professional fields such as air traffic control, or banking sys-
tems, would find these results significant for their practice.
Given the increasing severity of IS incidents and cyber-
crime (as illustrated in the opening examples), today more 
considerations should be given to preparing traditional IT 
functions for “surprises.” Moreover, increasingly severe 
weather (more severe, more often) on a global scale will 
amplify the frequency of critical IS outages, which means that 
IT functions in most organizations will be put under pressure 
to provide reliable IT services despite emergency conditions.
Traditional IT support functions are more likely to be 
significantly affected by events or situations that disrupt 
business-as-usual in their organizations if they do not have 
in place structures to fall back on in the cases of emergen-
cies. A small IS incident may cause serious disruption and 
become a “calamity” (as an interviewee in Civit put it) if 
not contained and addressed quickly. In his analysis of the 
Mann Gulch disaster, Weick (1993) stressed,
The recipe for disorganization in Mann Gulch is not at all that 
rare in everyday life. The recipe reads, thrust people into 
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unfamiliar roles, leave some key roles unfilled, make the task 
more ambiguous, discredit the role system, and make these 
changes in a context in which a small event can combine into 
something monstrous. (p. 638)
In the digital era we live in, in addition to “normal” IS inci-
dents and failures, any IT function is constantly under a cyber-
security threat. Therefore, to ensure reliability of IT in their 
organization, traditional IT functions could consider some of 
activities used in fast-response IT function (e.g. from those 
listed in Table 5) to establish more structured and formalized 
approach to coordination when dealing with emergencies.
Limitations and further research
This research is not free from limitations. First of all, our 
study took place in a particular kind of organization: a mili-
tary organization. On one hand, this provided the ideal setting 
to compare IT functions that supported a traditional and a 
fast-response organization within a similar setting. Both 
bureaucracy and fast-response work are fundamental charac-
teristics of military work, and the fact that ITSO had specific 
divisions for IT support for both these parts of the organiza-
tion meant we could compare these IT functions without 
additional organizational differences coming into play—both 
Civit and Milit are part of the same larger organization, after 
all. On the other hand, some of our findings may be specific 
for military organizations and are perhaps less generalizable 
to other IT functions. For example, the command-and-control 
logic that was especially manifest in how Milit responded to 
emergencies may be inherent to the military character of that 
organization, and it could be that we would not find this 
mechanism so prominently in other IT functions in fast-
response organizations. Also, in a military organization, the 
uniform plays an important role in coordination because it 
evokes common experiences and provides visual indication 
of ranks. IT functions supporting other fast-response organi-
zations (e.g. hospitals, fire brigades, or police) may not have 
such uniforms to rely upon (e.g. some policemen are dressed 
as civilians to remain under cover). Furthermore, in some 
organizations, the distinction between fast-response and tra-
ditional IT support may not be a clear cut. For example, in 
hospitals, fast-response IT support is required in A&E and in 
operation theaters (for surgeries), while some departments 
(e.g. outpatients) may not need same degree of urgency in IT 
support. Thus, future research should extend the investigation 
of how IT functions respond to a shift from “business as 
usual” to an emergency state beyond military organizations 
and study if similar patterns exist in other organizations that 
combine bureaucracy and fast response. Such studies could 
look into tensions associated with different degrees of urgency 
in the required IT support, and how the IT support function is 
dealing with these tensions. Investigating the link between IS 
incidents of various degrees and coordinative actions could 
be another avenue to explore in the future research.
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attack. Following this first attack on UK hospitals, ran-
somware spread to many countries around the world 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/12/
global-cyber-attack-ransomware-nsa-uk-nhs
2. Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008) defined dialogic practices 
as “semi-structures that describe rules of conversation” (pp. 
262–263). They referred to rules of dialogic practices offered 
by Boland et al. (1994) that include “discussing sources of 
knowledge, encouraging knowledge emergence, comparing 
multiple perspectives, keeping knowledge indeterminant to 
be repeatedly revised in response to new information, and 
structuring discussions to move between summary-level 
knowledge and detailed analysis” (pp. 262–263).
3. As Langley et al. (2013: 7) explained:
Comparing distinct cases is not however the only way to 
achieve replication. It is a common misconception that 
longitudinal case studies represent “samples of one.” 
However, it is important to note that the sample size for a 
process study is not the number of cases, but the number of 
temporal observations. Depending on how researchers 
structure their analysis, the number of temporal observations 
in a longitudinal study can be substantial.
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Figure 4. Research design and data collection process (schematic).
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Appendix C
Table 9. Interviewee details.
Interviewee details
No. IT function Gender Functional role Civilian/Military Interview duration
1 Civit M Senior project desk employee Civilian 0:52
2 Civit M Process manager Civilian 0:49
3 Civit M Unit manager Civilian 1:01
4 Civit M Product group manager Civilian 0:57
5 Civit M Senior process manager Civilian 1:08
6 Civit M Product manager Civilian 1:02
7 Civit M Delivery manager Civilian 1:01
8 Civit M Advisor Civilian 0:56
9 Civit M IT manager Civilian 0:54
10 Civit M Senior advisor Military 1:21
11 Civit M Senior process owner Civilian 1:09
12 Civit F Project quality assurance employee Civilian 0:48
13 Civit M Head of Cluster Civilian 0:55
14 Civit M Senior program manager/Escalation manager Military 2:20
15 Civit M Commander Civilian 1:18
16 Civit M System architect Civilian 0:50
17 Civit M Senior IT maintenance Civilian 1:03
18 Civit M Senior program manager Civilian 1:45
19 Civit F Senior project secretary Civilian 0:46
20 Civit F Transition manager Civilian 1:01
21 Civit M Senior project leader Civilian 0:56
22 Milit M Senior project manager Military 1:17
23 Milit M Head of Internal Affairs Civilian 0:57
24 Milit M Head of National Networks Military 1:01
25 Milit M Head of Client Contact Point Military 0:53
26 Milit M Head of Knowledge Pool Military 2:20
27 Milit F Quality manager Civilian 1:10
28 Milit M Senior technical specialist Civilian 1:05
29 Milit M Head of Controlling Department Military 1:10
30 Milit M Head of Information Security Military 1:00
31 Milit M Commander Military 1:09
32 Milit M Head of Operations Room Military 1:04
33 Milit M Head of Resource Planning/Configuration manager Military 0:48
